We present a new approach to the design of IND-CCA2 secure hybrid encryption schemes in the standard model. Our approach provides an efficient generic transformation from 1-universal to 2-universal hash proof systems. The transformation involves a randomness extractor based on a 4-wise independent hash function as the key derivation function. Our methodology can be instantiated with efficient schemes based on standard intractability assumptions such as DDH, QR and Paillier. Interestingly, our framework also allows to prove IND-CCA2 security of a hybrid version of 1991's Damgård's ElGamal public-key encryption scheme under the DDH assumption.
Introduction
Chosen-Ciphertext Security. Indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2 security) is by now the accepted standard security definition for public-key encryption schemes. It started with the development of security under lunchtime attacks (also called IND-CCA1) by Naor and Yung [22] , who also gave a proof of feasibility using inefficient non-interactive zero-knowledge techniques. This was extended to the more involved systems with IND-CCA2 security in their full generality [24, 9] .
Known practical constructions. Efficient designs in the standard model were first presented in the breakthrough works of Cramer and Shoup [3, 4, 5, 26] . At the heart of their design methodology is the notion of hash proof systems (HPSs), generalizing the initial system based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. Moreover, they are the first to formalize the notion of "Hybrid Encryption," where a public key cryptosystem is used to encapsulate the (session) key of a symmetric cipher which is subsequently used to conceal the data. This is also known as the KEM-DEM approach, after its two constituent parts (the KEM for key encapsulation mechanism, the DEM for data encapsulation mechanism); it is the most efficient way to employ a public key cryptosystem (and encrypting general strings rather than group elements).
Kurosawa and Desmedt [19] later improved upon the original work of Cramer and Shoup with a new paradigm. Whereas Cramer and Shoup [5] IND-CCA2 secure, Kurosawa and Desmedt show that with a stronger requirement on the DEM (i.e., one-time authenticated encryption), the requirement on the KEM becomes weaker and can be satisfied with any strongly 2-universal hash proof system. (Cramer and Shoup need both a 2-universal and a smooth hash proof system.)
Main Result. The main result of this work is a new paradigm for constructing IND-CCA2 secure hybrid encryption schemes, based on the Kurosawa-Desmedt paradigm. At its core is a surprisingly clean and efficient new method employing randomness extraction (as part of the key derivation) to transform a 1-universal hash proof system (that only assures IND-CCA1 security) to a 2-universal hash proof system. From that point on we follow the KurosawaDesmedt paradigm: combination with a one-time authenticated encryption scheme (as DEM) will provide IND-CCA2 security of the hybrid encryption scheme.
For the new transformation to work we require a sufficiently compressing 4-wise independent hash function (made part of the public key); we also need a generalization of the leftover hash lemma [15] that may be of independent interest. The efficient transformation enables the design of new and efficient IND-CCA2 secure hybrid encryption schemes based on various hard subset membership problem, such as the DDH assumption, Paillier's DCR assumption, the family of Linear assumptions, and the quadratic residuosity assumption.
A New Proof for Hybrid Damgård's ElGamal. One application of our method is centered around Damgård's public-key scheme [6] (from 1991) which he proved IND-CCA1 secure under the rather strong knowledge of exponent assumption. 1 This scheme can be viewed as a "double-base" variant of the original ElGamal encryption scheme [11] and consequently it is often referred to as Damgård's ElGamal in the literature. We first view the scheme as a hybrid encryption scheme (as advocated in [26, 5] ), applying our methodology of randomness extraction in the KEM's symmetric key derivation before the authenticated encryption (as DEM). The resulting scheme is a hybrid Damgård's ElGamal which is IND-CCA2 secure, under the standard DDH assumption. We furthermore propose a couple of variants of our basic hybrid scheme that offer certain efficiency tradeoffs. Compared to Cramer and Shoup's original scheme [3] and the improved scheme given by Kurosawa-Desmedt [19] , our scheme crucially removes the dependence on the hard to construct target collision hash functions (UOWHF), using an easyto-instantiate 4-wise independent hash function instead. Furthermore, the IND-CCA2 security of hybrid Damgård's ElGamal can be directly explained through our randomness extraction paradigm when applying it to the DDH-based 1-universal hash proof system. In contrast, due to the dependence on the target colission resistant hash function, the efficient schemes from [3, 19] cannot be directly explained through Cramer and Shoup's hash proof system framework [4] and therefore all require seperate proofs.
Related Work. Various previous proofs of variants of Damgård's original scheme have been suggested after Damgård himself proved it IND-CCA1 secure under the strong "knowledge of exponent" assumption (an assumption that has often been criticized in the literature; e.g., it is not efficiently falsifiable according to the classification of Naor [21] ). More recent works are by Gjøsteen [14] who showed the scheme IND-CCA1 secure under some interactive version of the DDH assumption, where the adversary is given oracle access to some (restricted) DDH oracle. Also, Wu and Stinson [29] , and at the same time Lipmaa [20] improve on the above two results. However, their security results are much weaker than ours: they only prove IND-CCA1 security of Damgård's ElGamal, still requiring security assumptions that are either interactive or of "knowledge of exponent" type. Finally, Hieu and Desmedt [7] recently showed a hybrid variant that is IND-CCA2 secure, yet under an even stronger assumption than Damgård's.
We remark that Cramer and Shoup [4] already proposed a generic transformation from 1-universal to 2-universal HPSs. Unfortunately their construction involves a significant overhead: the key of their transformed 2-universal HPS has linearly many keys of the original 1-universal HPS. We further remark that the notion of randomness extraction has had numerous applications in complexity and cryptography, and in particular in extracting random keys at the final step of key exchange protocols. Indeed, Cramer and Shoup [4] already proposed using a pairwise independent hash function to turn a 1-universal HPS into a 2-universal HPS. Our novel usage is within the context of hybrid encryption as a tool that shifts the integrity checking at decryption time solely to the DEM portion. In stark contrast to the generic transformations by Cramer and Shoup ours is practical. We also remark that several other works also use the general concept of randomness extraction in the setting of public-key cryptography, e.g., [2, 5, 8, 12] .
Preliminaries

Notation
If x is a string, then |x| denotes its length, while if S is a set then |S| denotes its size. If k ∈ N then 1 k denotes the string of k ones. If S is a set then s ← R S denotes the operation of picking an element s of S uniformly at random. We write A(x, y, . . .) to indicate that A is an algorithm with inputs x, y, . . . and by z ← R A(x, y, . . .) we denote the operation of running A with inputs (x, y, . . .) and letting z be the output. We write lg x for logarithms over the reals with base 2. The statistical distance between two random variables X and Y having a common domain
The min-entropy of a random variable X is defined as H ∞ (X) = − lg(max x∈X Pr[X = x]).
Public-Key Encryption
A public key encryption scheme PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec) with message space M(k) consists of three polynomial time algorithms (PTAs), of which the first two, Kg and Enc, are probabilistic and the last one, Dec, is deterministic. Public/secret keys for security parameter k ∈ N are generated using (pk , sk ) ← R Kg(1 k ). Given such a key pair, a message m ∈ M(k) is encrypted by C ← R Enc(pk , m); a ciphertext is decrypted by m ← R Dec(sk, C ), where possibly Dec outputs ⊥ to denote an invalid ciphertext. For consistency, we require that for all k ∈ N, all messages m ∈ M(k), it must hold that Pr[Dec(sk , Enc(pk , m)) = m] = 1 where the probability is taken over the above randomized algorithms and (pk , sk ) ← R Kg(1 k ).
The security we require for PKE is IND-CCA2 security [24, 10] . We define the advantage of an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) as
The adversary A 2 is restricted not to query Dec(sk , ·) with C * . PKE scheme PKE is said to be indistinguishable against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2 secure in short) if the advantage function Adv For integers k, t, Q we also define Adv cca2 PKE,t,Q (k) = max A Adv cca2 PKE,A (k), where the maximum is over all A that run in time at most t while making at most Q decryption queries.
We also mention the weaker security notion of indistinguishability against lunch-time attacks (IND-CCA1 security), which is defined as IND-CCA2 security with the restriction that the adversary is not allowed to make decryption queries after having seen the challenge ciphertext.
Hash Proof Systems
Smooth Projective Hashing. We recall the notion of hash proof systems as introduced by Cramer and Shoup [4] . Let C, K be sets and V ⊂ C a language. In the context of public-key encryption (and viewing a hash proof system as a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) [5] with "special algebraic properties") and may think of C as the set of all ciphertexts, V ⊂ C as the set of all valid (consistent) ciphertexts, and K as the set of all symmetric keys. Let Λ sk : C → K be a hash function indexed with sk ∈ SK, where SK is a set. A hash function Λ sk is projective if there exists a projection µ : SK → PK such that µ(sk ) ∈ PK defines the action of Λ sk over the subset V. That is, for every C ∈ V, the value K = Λ sk (C) is uniquely determined by µ(sk ) and C. In contrast, nothing is guaranteed for C ∈ C \ V, and it may not be possible to compute Λ sk (C) from µ(sk ) and C. More precisely, following [17] we define universal 1 and universal 2 as follows.
where in the above pk = µ(sk ) for sk ← R SK and K ← R K.
The projective hash function is ǫ 2 -almost universal 2 if for all C, C * ∈ C \ V with
We furthermore make the following definitions about projective hash functions.
κ-entropic. The projective hash function is ǫ 1 -almost κ-entropic if for all C ∈ C \ V,
where in the above pk = µ(sk ) for sk ← R SK. Note that every ǫ 1 -almost universal 1 projective hash function also has ǫ 1 -almost κ-entropic, for κ = log 2 (|K|).
Collision probability. To a projective hash function we also associate the collision probability, δ, defined as
Hash Proof System. A hash proof system HPS = (Param, Pub, Priv) consists of three algorithms. The randomized algorithm Param(1 k ) generates parametrized instances of params = (group, K, C, V, PK, SK, Λ (·) : C → K, µ : SK → PK), where group may contain some additional structural parameters. The deterministic public evaluation algorithm Pub inputs the projection key pk = µ(sk ), C ∈ V and a witness r of the fact that C ∈ V and returns K = Λ sk (C). The deterministic private evaluation algorithm Priv inputs sk ∈ SK and returns Λ sk (C), without knowing a witness. We further assume that µ is efficiently computable and that there are efficient algorithms given for sampling sk ∈ SK, sampling C ∈ V uniformly (or negligibly close to) together with a witness r, sampling C ∈ C uniformly (given sk ), and for checking membership in C.
We say that a hash proof system is universal 1 (resp., κ-entropic, universal 2 ) if for all possible outcomes of Param(1 k ) the underlying projective hash function is ǫ 1 (k)-almost universal 1 (resp., ǫ 1 (k)-almost entropic, ǫ 2 (k)-almost universal 2 ) for negligible ǫ 1 (k) (resp., ǫ 2 (k)). Furthermore, we say that a hash proof system is perfectly universal 1 (resp., κ-entropic, universal 2 ) if ǫ 1 (k) = 0 (resp., ǫ 2 (k)).
Subset Membership Problem. As computational problem we require that the subset membership problem is hard in HPS which means that for random C 0 ∈ V and random C 1 ∈ C \ V the two elements C 0 and C 1 are computationally indistinguishable. This is captured by defining the advantage function Adv sm HPS,A (k) of an adversary A as
where C is taken from the output of Param(
Hash Proof Systems with Trapdoor. Following [19] , we also require that the subset membership problem can be efficiently solved with a master trapdoor. More formally, we assume that the hash proof system HPS additionally contains two algorithms Param ′ and Decide. The alternative parameter generator Param ′ (1 k ) generates output indistinguishable from the one of Param(1 k ) and additionally returns a trapdoor ω. The subset membership deciding algorithm Decide(params, ω, x) returns 1 if x ∈ V, and 0, otherwise. All known hash proof systems actually have such a trapdoor.
Symmetric Encryption
A symmetric encryption scheme SE = (E, D) is specified by its encryption algorithm E (encrypting m ∈ M(k) with keys S ∈ K SE (k)) and decryption algorithm D (returning m ∈ M(k) or ⊥). Here we restrict ourselves to deterministic algorithms E and D.
The most common notion of security for symmetric encryption is that of (one-time) ciphertext indistinguishability (IND-OT), which requires that all efficient adversaries fail to distinguish between the encryptions of two messages of their choice. Another common security requirement is ciphertext authenticity. (One-time) ciphertext integrity (INT-OT) requires that no efficient adversary can produce a new valid ciphertext under some key when given one encryption of a message of his choice under the same key. A symmetric encryption scheme which satisfies both requirements simultaneously is called secure in the sense of authenticated encryption (AE-OT secure). Note that AE-OT security is a stronger notion than chosen-ciphertext security. Formal definitions and constructions are provided in Appendix A. There we also recall (following the encrypt-then-mac approach [1, 5] ) how to build a symmetric scheme with k-bit keys secure in the sense of AE-OT from the following basic primitives:
• a (computationally secure) one-time symmetric encryption scheme with k-bit keys;
• a (computationally secure) MAC (existentially unforgeable) with k-bit keys;
• and a (computationally secure) key-derivation function.
Randomness Extraction
In this section we review a few concepts related to probability distributions and extracting uniform bits from weak random sources. As a technical tool for our new paradigm, we will prove the following generalization of the leftover hash lemma [15] : if H is 4-wise independent, then (H, H(X), H(X)) is close to uniformly random, where X,X can be dependent (but of course we have to require X =X).
Let HS be a family of hash functions H : X → Y. With |HS| we denote the number of functions in this family and when sampling from HS we assume a uniform distribution. Let k > 1 be an integer, the hash-family HS is k-wise independent if for any sequence of distinct elements x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ X the random variables H(x 1 ), . . . , H(x k ), where H ← R HS, are uniform random. 2 Recall that the leftover hash lemma states that for a 2-wise independent hash function H and a random variable X with min-entropy exceeding the bitlength of H's range, the random variable (H, H(X)) is close to uniformly random [15] .
Lemma 3.1 Let X ∈ X be a random variable where H ∞ (X) ≥ κ. Let HS be a family of pairwise independent hash functions with domain X and image {0, 1} ℓ . Then for H ← R HS and
We will now prove a generalization of the leftover hash lemma that states that even when the hash function is evaluated in two distinct points, the two outputs jointly still look uniformly random. To make this work, we need a 4-wise independent hash function and, as before, sufficient min-entropy in the input distribution. We do note that, unsurprisingly, the loss of entropy compared to Lemma 3.1 is higher, as expressed in the bound on the statistical distance (or alternatively, in the bound on the min-entropy required in the input distribution).
Lemma 3.2 Let (X,X) ∈ X × X be two random variables (having joint distribution) where
Let HS be a family of 4-wise independent hash functions with domain X and image {0, 1} ℓ . Then for H ← R HS and U 2ℓ ← R {0, 1} 2ℓ ,
Proof: We will first prove the lemma for δ = 0, and at the end show how the general case δ > 0 can be reduced to it. Let d = lg |HS|. For a random variable Y and Y ′ an independent copy of Y , we denote with
= Pr
2 A simple construction of a k-wise independent hash function Zp → Zp is the following: to sample a function, sample k elements c0, . . . , c k−1 ←R Z k p , and define hc 0 ,...,c k−1 (X) = c0
We define the event E, which holds if X,X, X ′ ,X ′ are pairwise different.
Where in the first step we used that δ = 0, and thus X =X, X ′ =X ′ . In the second step we use the union bound and also our assumption that the min entropy of X andX is at least κ (and thus, e.g., Pr[X = X ′ ] ≤ 2 −κ ). With this we can write (7) as
where in the second step we used that H is 4-wise independent. Let Y be a random variable with support Y and U be uniform over Y, then
In particular,
Using that Y 1 ≤ |Y| Y 2 for any random variable Y with support Y, we obtain
This concludes the proof of (5) for δ = 0. Now consider X,X as in the statement of the lemma where Pr[X =X] ≤ δ for some δ > 0. Let π denote any permutation over X without a fixpoint, i.e. π(x) = x for all x ∈ X . Let (Y,Ỹ ) be sampled as follows: first sample (X,X), if X =X let (Y,Ỹ ) = (X,X), otherwise sample Y ← R X uniformly at random and setỸ := π(Y ). By definition Pr[Y =Ỹ ] = 0, and as (Y,Ỹ ) has the same distribution as (X,X) except with probability δ, ∆ (X,X) ; (Y,Ỹ ) ≤ δ. Moreover using that max x∈X Pr[
Thus H ∞ (Y ) = κ − log(1 + δ), and similarly H ∞ (Ỹ ) = κ − log(1 + δ). We can now apply the lemma for the special case δ = 0 (which we proved) and get
The lemma now follows as
Hybrid Encryption from Randomness Extraction
In this section we revisit the general construction of hybrid encryption from universal 2 hash proof systems. As our main technical result we show an efficient transformation from a κ-entropic to a universal 2 HPS. Combining the latter with an AE-OT secure symmetric cipher gives an IND-CCA2 secure hybrid encryption scheme. This result can be readily applied to all known κ-entropic hash proof systems with a hard subset membership problem (e.g., from Paillier, QR [4] , DDH, and n-Linear [17, 25] ) to obtain a number of new IND-CCA2 secure hybrid encryption schemes. In Sections 5 and 5.4 we will work out the consequences for DDH-based schemes.
Hybrid Encryption from HPSs
Recall the notion of a hash proof system from Section 2.3. Kurosawa and Desmedt [19] proposed the following hybrid encryption scheme which improved the schemes from Cramer and Shoup [4] . Let HPS = (Param, Pub, Priv) be a hash proof system and let SE = (E, D) be an AE-OT secure symmetric encryption scheme whose key-space K SE matches the key-space K of the HPS. 3 The system parameters of the scheme consist of params ← R Param(1 k ).
Kg(k). Choose random sk ← R SK and define pk = µ(sk ) ∈ PK. Return (pk , sk ).
Enc(pk , m). Pick C ← R V together with its witness r that C ∈ V. The session key
Return the ciphertext (C , ψ).
Note that the trapdoor property of the HPS is not used in the actual scheme: it is only needed in the proof. However, as an alternative the trapdoor can be added to the secret key. 4 This allows explicit rejection of invalid ciphertexts during decryption. The security of this explicit-rejection variant is identical to that of the scheme above.
The following was proved in [19, 13, 17] .
Theorem 4.1 Assume HPS is universal 2 with hard subset membership problem (with trapdoor), and SE is AE-OT secure. Then the encryption scheme is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2.
We remark that even though in general the KEM part of the above scheme cannot be proved IND-CCA2 secure [16] , it can be proved "IND-CCCA" secure. The latter notion was defined in [17] and proved sufficient to yield IND-CCA2 secure encryption when combined with a AE-OT secure cipher. We also remark that the security bound in the above theorem implicitly requires that the image of Λ sk (·) restricted to V is sufficiently large (say, at least contains 2 k elements). This is since otherwise the key-space of the symmetric scheme is too small and the two advantages functions Adv int-ot SE,t (k) Adv ind-ot SE,t (k) cannot be negligible. There is also an analogue "lite version" for 1-universal HPS, giving IND-CCA1 only (and using a slightly weaker asymmetric primitive). It can be stated as follows. 
A Generic Transformation from κ-entropic to universal 2 HPSs
Our transformation is as follows. Given a projective hash function Λ sk : C → K with projection µ : SK → PK and a family of hash functions HS with H : K → {0, 1} ℓ . Then we define the hashed variant of it as:
We also define PK HS = PK × HS and SK HS = SK × HS, such the the hashed projection is given by µ HS : SK HS → PK HS , µ HS (sk , H) = (pk , H). This also induces a transformation from a hash proof system HPS into HPS HS , where the above transformation is applied to the projective hash function. Note that C and V are the same for HPS and HPS HS (so that in particular the trapdoor property for the language V is inherited).
We are now ready to state our main theorem.
Theorem 4.3
Assume HPS is ǫ 1 -almost κ-entropic with collision probability δ and HS is a family of 4-wise independent hash functions with H :
Proof: Let us consider, for all C, C * ∈ C \ V with C = C * , the statistical distance relevant for universal 2 for HPS and let Y be the following random variable
where pk = µ(sk ) for sk ← R SK, H ← R HS and U 2ℓ ← R {0, 1} 2ℓ . Then we can use the triangle inequality to get
where as before pk = µ(sk ) for sk ← R SK, H ← R HS and U ℓ ← R {0, 1} ℓ . In the latter probability space, let E C * be the event that H ∞ (Λ sk (C * )) | pk ) ≥ κ. We can upper bound the second term of (11), using again the triangle inequality in the first step, as
In the last step we used the (standard) leftover hash-lemma (Lemma 3.1). Let E C be the event that H ∞ (Λ sk (C)) | pk ) ≥ κ. Similarly, we now bound the first term of (11) as
where in the last step we used Lemma 3.2.
Hybrid Encryption from κ-entropic HPSs
Putting the pieces from the last two section together we get a new IND-CCA2 secure hybrid encryption scheme from any κ-entropic hash proof system. Let HPS = (Param, Pub, Priv) be a hash proof system, let HS be a family of hash functions with H : K → {0, 1} ℓ and let SE = (E, D) be an AE-OT secure symmetric encryption scheme with key-space K SE = {0, 1} ℓ . The system parameters of the scheme consist of params ← R Param(1 k ).
Kg(k). Choose random sk ← R SK and define pk = µ(sk ) ∈ PK. Pick a random hash key τ for H. The public-key is (τ, pk ), the secret-key is (τ, sk ).
Enc(pk , m). Pick C ← R V together with its witness r that C ∈ V. The session key K = H τ (Λ sk (C)) ∈ {0, 1} ℓ is computed as K ← H τ (Pub(pk , C, r)). The symmetric ciphertext is ψ ← E K (m). Return the ciphertext (C , ψ).
Dec(sk , C ). Reconstruct the key
Combining Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 gives us the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4
Assume HPS is κ-entropic with hard subset membership problem and with collision probability δ(k), that HS is a family of 4-wise independent hash functions with H : K → {0, 1} ℓ(k) , and that SE is AE-OT secure. If 2 ℓ(k)−κ(k)/2 and δ(k) are negligible, then the encryption scheme above is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2. In particular,
Instantiations from the DDH Assumption
In this section we discuss two practical instantations of our randomness extraction framework whose security is based on the DDH assumption. A concrete instantiation from the QR assumption can be found in Appendix 6.
The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption
A group scheme GS [5] specifies a sequence (GR k ) k∈N of group descriptions. For every value of a security parameter k ∈ N, the pair GR k = (G k , p k ) specifies a cyclic (multiplicative) group G k of prime order p k . Henceforth, for notational convenience, we tend to drop the index k. We assume the existence of an efficient sampling algorithm x ← R G and an efficient membership algorithm. We define the ddh-advantage of an adversary B as
We say that the DDH problem is hard in GS if the advantage function Adv ddh GS,B (k) is a negligible function in k for all probabilistic PTA B.
Variant 1: the Scheme HE 1
The universal 1 hash proof system. We recall a universal 1 HPS by Cramer and Shoup [4] , whose hard subset membership problem is based on the DDH assumption. Let GS be a group scheme where GR k specifies (G, p) and let g 1 , g 2 be two independent generators of G. Define
The value r ∈ Z p is a witness of C ∈ V. The trapdoor generator Param picks a uniform trapdoor ω ∈ Z p and computes g 2 = g ω 1 . Note that using trapdoor ω, algorithm Decide can efficienctly perform subset membership tests for C = (c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ C by checking whether c ω 1 = c 2 . Let SK = Z 2 p , PK = G, and
. This defines the output of Param(1 k ). For C = (c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ C define Λ sk (C) := c
This defines Priv(sk , C). Given pk = µ(sk ), C ∈ V and a witness r ∈ Z p such that C = (c 1 , c 2 ) = (g r 1 , g r 2 ) public evaluation Pub(pk , C, r) computes K = Λ sk (C) as
Correctness follows by (12) and the definition of µ. This completes the description of HPS.
Clearly, under the DDH assumption, the subset membership problem is hard in HPS. Moreover, this HPS is known to be (perfect) universal 1 [4] :
The above HPS is perfect universal 1 (so ǫ 1 = 0) with collision probability δ = 1/p.
Proof: To show that the HPS is universal 1 , it suffices to show that given the public key X and any pair (C, K) ∈ (C \ V) × K, there exists exactly one secret key sk such that µ(sk ) = X and Λ sk (C) = K. Let ω ∈ Z * p be such that g 2 = g ω 1 , write C = (g r 1 , g s 2 ) for r = s and consider a possible secret key sk = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ Z 2 p . Then we simultaneously need that µ(sk ) = g
for some y ∈ Z p ). Then, using linear algebra, x 1 and x 2 follow uniquely from r, s, x, y and ω provided that the relevant determinant (s − r)ω = 0. This is guaranteed here since r = s and ω = 0.
To verify the bound on the collision probability δ it suffices -due to symmetry-to determine for any distinct pair (C, C * ) ∈ (C \ V) 2 the probability Pr sk [Λ sk (C) = Λ sk (C * )]. In other words, for (r, s) = (r ′ , s ′ ) (with r = s and r ′ = s ′ , but that is irrelevant here) we have that δ = Pr
(For the last step, use that if r = r ′ for any x 2 only one x 1 will "work"; if r = r ′ then necessarily s = s ′ and for any x 1 there is a unique x 2 to satisfy the equation.)
The hybrid encryption scheme HE 1 . For our hybrid encryption scheme we make the following assumptions.
• Let GS be a group scheme where GR k specifies (G, p) and the DDH assumption holds;
• Let HS be a family H k : G → {0, 1} ℓ(k) of 4-wise independent hash functions with lg p ≥ 4ℓ(k); • Let SE = (E, D) be a AE-OT secure symmetric scheme with key-space {0, 1} ℓ(k) . Applying the transformation from Theorem 4.3 one obtains an ǫ 2 -almost universal 2 hash proof system with ǫ 2 ≤ 2 · 2 −ℓ(k) (using Lemma 5.1 and |G| = p ≥ 2 4ℓ(k) ). The resulting hybrid encryption scheme is depicted in Figure 1 . Corollary 4.4 (in conjuction with Lemma 5.1) can be used to bound an adversary's IND-CCA2 advantage.
Pick random key τ for H pk ← (X, τ ) ; sk ← (x 1 , x 2 ) Return (sk , pk ) Figure 1 : Hybrid encryption scheme HE 1 = (Kg, Enc, Dec). Theorem 5.2 Let GS = (G, p) be a group scheme where the DDH problem is hard, let H be a family of 4-wise independent hash functions from G to {0, 1} ℓ(k) with lg p ≥ 4ℓ(k), and let SE be a symmetric encryption that is secure in the sense of AE-OT. Then HE 1 is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2. In particular,
Proof: Since the HPS is (perfectly) universal 1 it is also (perfectly) κ-entropic with κ = lg(|K|) ≥ 4ℓ(k). It leaves to bound the loss due to the κ-entropic to universal 2 HPS transformation from Corollary 4.4: 2
where we used that |K| = |G| = p ≥ 2 4ℓ and (by Lemma 5.1) ǫ 1 = 0 and δ = 1/p.
In terms of concrete security, Theorem 5.2 requires the image {0, 1} ℓ(k) of H to be sufficiently small, i.e., ℓ(k) ≤ 1 4 lg p. For a symmetric cipher with ℓ(k) = k = 80 bits keys we are forced to use groups of order lg p = 4k = 320 bits. For some specific groups such as elliptic curves this can be a drawback since there one typically works with groups of order lg p = 2k = 160 bits.
Relation to Damgård's ElGamal. In HE 1 , invalid ciphertexts of the form c ω 1 = c 2 are reject implicitly by authenticity properties of the symmetric cipher. Similar to [5] , a variant of this scheme, HE er 1 = (Kg, Enc, Dec), in which such invalid ciphertexts get explicitly rejected is given in Figure 2 . The scheme is slightly simplified compared to a direct explicit version that adds the trapdoor to the secret key; the simplification can be justified using the techniques of Lemma 5.1.
We remark that, interestingly, Damgård's encryption scheme [6] (also known as Damgård's ElGamal) is a special case of HE er 1 where the hash function H is the identity function (or an easy-to-invert, canonical embedding of the group into, say, the set of bitstrings) and SE is "any easy to invert group operation" [6] , for example the one-time pad with E K (m) = K ⊕ m. In his paper, Damgård proved IND-CCA1 security of his scheme under the DDH assumption and the knowledge of exponent assumption in GS. 5 Our schemes HE er 1 and HE 1 can therefore be viewed 5 To be more precise, Damgård only formally proved one-way (OW-CCA1) security of his scheme, provided as hybrid versions of Damgård's ElGamal scheme, that can be proved secure under the DDH assumption.
Variant 2: the Scheme HE 2
The universal 1 hash proof system. We now give an alternative (and new) universal 1 hash proof system from the DDH assumption. Keep C and V as before. Define SK = Z 4 p , PK = G 2 , and K = G 2 . For sk = (x 1 , x 2 ,x 1 ,x 2 ) ∈ Z 4 , define µ(sk ) = (X,X) = (g
This also defines Priv(sk , C). Given pk = µ(sk ), C ∈ V and a witness r ∈ Z p such that
, public evaluation Pub(pk , C, r) computes K = Λ sk (C) as
Similar to Lemma 5.1 we can prove the following.
Lemma 5.3
The above HPS is perfect universal 1 with collision probability δ = 1/p 2 .
The scheme HE 2 . For our second hybrid encryption scheme HE 2 we make the same assumption as for HE 1 , with the difference that HS is now a family H k : G 2 → {0, 1} ℓ(k) of 4-wise independent hash functions with lg p ≥ 2ℓ(k). The resulting hybrid encryption scheme obtained by applying Corollary 4.4 (in conjuction with Lemma 5.3) is depicted in Figure 3 .
Theorem 5.4 Let GS = (G, p) be a group scheme where the DDH problem is hard, let H be a family of 4-wise independent hash functions from G 2 to {0, 1} ℓ(k) with lg p ≥ 2ℓ(k), and let SE be a symmetric encryption that is secure in the sense of AE-OT. Then HE 2 is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2. In particular,
Note that HE 2 now only has the restriction lg p ≥ 2ℓ(k) which nicely fits with the typical choice of ℓ(k) = k and lg p = 2k. So one is free to use any cryptographic group, in particular also elliptic curve groups. Similar to HE er 1 , the variant HE er 2 with explicit rejection can again be proven equivalent. In the explicit rejection variant, HE er 2 , the public-key contains the group elements g 2 = g ω 1 , X = g x 1 , andX = gx 1 ), and decryption first checks if c ω 1 = c 2 and then computes K = H τ (c x 1 , cx 1 ). Relation to a scheme by Kurosawa and Desmedt. We remark that, interestingly, the scheme HE 2 is quite similar to the one by Kurosawa and Desmedt [19] . The only difference is that encryption in the latter defines the key as K = X rt ·X r ∈ G, where t = T τ (c 1 , c 2 ) is the output of a target collision-resistant hash function
that the original ElGamal scheme is OW-CPA secure. But he also remarks that his proof can be reformulated to prove IND-CCA1 security, provided that ElGamal itself is IND-CPA secure. IND-CPA security of ElGamal under the DDH assumption was only formally proved later [27] . Figure 3 : Hybrid encryption scheme HE 2 = (Kg, Enc, Dec).
Efficiency Considerations
In this section we compare the efficiency of HE 1 /HE 2 and their explicit rejection variants HE er 1 /HE er 2 with the reference scheme by Kurosawa and Desmedt [19] and its variants [13, 17] . The drawback of HE 1 is that, in terms of concrete security, Theorem 5.2 requires the image {0, 1} ℓ of H to be sufficiently small, i.e., ℓ ≤ 1 4 lg p. Consequently, for a symmetric cipher with ℓ = k = 80 bits keys we are forced to use groups of order lg p ≥ 4k = 320 bits. For some specific groups such as elliptic curves this can be a drawback since there one typically works with groups of order lg = 2k = 160 bits. However, for other more traditional groups such as prime subgroups of Z * q one sometimes takes a subgroup of order already satisfying the requirement lg p ≥ 4k. The scheme HE 2 overcomes this restriction at the cost of an additional exponentiation in the encryption algorithm. will have to work in a larger (sub)group. Even when underlying operations such as multiplication and squaring remain the same, the increased exponent length will make this scheme noticeably slower than the other two options.
For any given group, it is hard to tell in advance whether HE er 2 or KD will be fastest. For encryption, they differ only in one point: the key derivation. In HE er 2 the symmetric key is computed as K = H τ (X r ,X r ) ∈ {0, 1} k where H τ is a 4-wise independent hash function, in KD it is computed as K = X rt ·X r ∈ G, where t = T τ (c 1 , c 2 ), for a target collision resistant hash function T (plus possibly the application of a key-derivation function KDF to represent the group element K as a bit string suitable for symmetric key, cf. Appendix A). If one would ignore the hashing, we see that we need to compute two single exponentiations (distinct bases, same exponent) in HE er 2 versus a double exponentiation in KD. It is well known that in most scenarios a double exponentiation costs significantly less than two separate single exponentiations. In practice this is mainly due to the possibility to combine the squarings from both components of the double exponentiation, thus saving lg p squarings (when compared to two single exponentiations) and, to a lesser degree, to the ability to encode the two exponents simultaneously in such a way that the weight is less than twice that of a single encoded exponent, thus saving on multiplications. This all benefits KD. However, it should be noted that in certain scenarios the advantage is less pronounced, e.g., when squaring is for free or when precomputation on the public key (including group elements X andX) should be taken into account. We remark that the decryption algorithms of KD and HE Table 1 : Efficiency comparison for known CCA2-secure encryption schemes from the DDH assumption. All "symmetric" operations concerning the authenticated encryption scheme are ignored. The symbols "tcr" and "4wh" denote one application of a target collision-resistant hash function and 4-wise independent hash function, respectively.
one go. The additional cost of having a third exponent in our case does therefore not incur too much of a performance penalty. Indeed, the main computational advantage of our scheme lies in the much simpler hash that is required to attain provable security. A 4-wise independent hash function is a combinatorial object that can be implemented with three multiplications (typically in a field of size ≈ p, not in G itself). On the other hand, a target collision resistant hash function is a computational object. Bootstrapping such a hash function from the presumed hardness of the DDH problem will not be cheap. It will most likely cost at least the equivalent of one exponentiation. 6 In that case HE er 2 will be faster than KD, both for encryption and decryption. Another important advantage of HE er 2 is that in encryption the computation of c 1 , c 2 , and the key (X r ,X r ) can be done in parallel, whereas in KD the computation of the key X r·T(c 1 ,c 2 )X r can only be done after the values c 1 and c 2 are available.
6 Instantiations from residuosity assumptions 6.1 Quadratic residuosity assumption Quadratic residuosity assumption. Let b = b(k) : N → N >0 be a function. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus, where p = 2P + 1 and q = 2Q + 1, for two odd primes P, Q of bit-length b/2. Let J N denote the (cyclic) subgroup of elements in Z * N with Jacobi symbol 1, and let QR N denote the unique (cyclic) subgroup of Z * N of order P Q (so in particular QR N ⊂ J N ) which is the group of all squares modulo N . Let g be a generator of QR N . We assume the existence of an RSA instance generator RSAgen that generates the above elements, together with a random generator g ∈ QR N . The quadratic residuosity (QR) assumption states that distinguishing a random element from QR N from a random element from J N is computationally infeasible.
The hash proof system. Define C = J N and V = QR N = {g r : r ∈ Z P Q }. The value r ∈ Z is a witness of C ∈ V. (Note that it is possible to sample an almost uniform element from V together with a witness by first picking r ∈ Z ⌊N/4⌋ and defining C = g r .) Define SK = Z n 2P Q , PK = QR n N , and K = J n N . For sk = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ Z n 2P Q , define µ(sk ) = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) = (g x 1 , . . . , g xn ). (Note that X i does not reveal whether 0 ≤ x i < P Q or P Q ≤ x i < 2P Q.)
For C ∈ C define Λ sk (C) := (C x 1 , . . . , C xn ) . 6 To the best of our knowledge, the most efficient construction of a (target) collision resistant hash function which is provably secure in groups with hard DDH problem is the function Hτ (x1, x2) := A Figure 4 : The hybrid encryption scheme from the QR assumption.
This defines Priv(sk , C). Given pk = µ(sk ), C ∈ V and a witness r ∈ Z P Q such that C = g r , public evaluation Pub(pk , C, r) computes K = Λ sk (C) as
This completes the description of HPS. Under the QR assumption, the subset membership problem is hard in HPS. Furthermore, for C ∈ C \ V, given pk = µ(sk ), each of the C x i contains exactly one bit of min entropy such that H ∞ ((C x 1 , . . . , C xn ) | pk ) = n. Therefore:
The hash proof system is n-entropic with collision probability δ ≤ (4/N ) n .
The encryption scheme. Let H : J n N → {0, 1} k be a 4-wise independent hash function and let SE be a symmetric cipher with key-space {0, 1} k , i.e., we set ℓ(k) = k. For the encryption scheme obtained by applying Corollary 4.4 (which is depicted in Figure 4 ) we choose the parameter n = n(k) = 4k + 1 such that k − (n − 1)/2 is bounded by −k. Theorem 6.2 Assume the QR assumption holds, let H be a family of 4-wise independent hash functions from J n(k) N to {0, 1} k with n(k) ≥ 4k + 1, and let SE be a symmetric encryption that is secure in the sense of AE-OT. Then the encryption scheme from Figure 4 is IND-CCA2 secure. In particular,
The scheme has very compact ciphertexts but encryption/decryption are quite expensive since they require n = 4k + 1 exponentiations in Z * N . (Note that decryption can be sped up considerably compared to encryption by using CRT and multi-exponentiation techniques.)
Higher residuosity assumption
Higher residuosity assumption. Let 1 ≤ B < b be two functions in k. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus, where p = 2P ′ P + 1 and q = 2Q ′ Q + 1 are distinct b/2-bit integers, P, Q are distinct primes of the same length and P ′ , Q ′ are distinct B-bit primes. 7 Let J N denote the subgroup of elements in Z * N with Jacobi symbol 1, and let G P Q denote the unique (cyclic) subgroup of Z * N of order P Q (so in particular G P Q ⊂ J N ). We assume the existence of an instance generator Cgen that (on input b and B) generates the above elements, together with a random generator g ∈ G P Q . The higher residuosity (HR) assumption states that distinguishing a random element from G P Q from a random element from J N is computationally infeasible. Note Figure 5 : The hybrid encryption scheme from the HR assumption.
that the HR assumption for B = 1 (and hence P ′ = Q ′ = 1) is the QR assumption. Concrete values for the HR assumption are b = 1024 and B = 160.
The hash proof system. Define C = J N and V = G P Q = {g r : r ∈ Z P Q }. The value r ∈ Z is a witness of C ∈ V. (Note that it is possible to sample an almost uniform element from V together with a witness by first picking r ∈ Z ⌊N/2 2B+2 ⌋ and defining C = g r .) Define SK = Z n 2P QP ′ Q ′ , PK = G n P Q , and K = J n N . For sk = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ Z n 2P Q , define µ(sk ) = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) = (g x 1 , . . . , g xn ). Note that, in an information theoretic sense, each X i only reveals x i mod P Q. For C ∈ C define Λ sk (C) := (C x 1 , . . . , C xn ) .
This defines Priv(sk , C). Given pk = µ(sk ), C ∈ V and a witness r ∈ Z P Q such that C = g r , public evaluation Pub(pk , C, r) computes K = Λ sk (C) as K = (X r 1 , . . . , X r n ) . This completes the description of HPS. Under the HR assumption, the subset membership problem is hard in HPS. For C ∈ C \ V, given pk = µ(sk ), each of the C x i contains at least 2B − 1 bits of min entropy such that H ∞ ((C x 1 , . . . , C xn ) | pk ) = n(2B − 1). Therefore: Lemma 6.3 The hash proof system is n(2B −1)-entropic with collision probability δ = (4/N ) n . The encryption scheme. Let H : J n N → {0, 1} k be a 4-wise independent hash function and let SE be a symmetric cipher with key-space {0, 1} k , i.e., we set ℓ(k) = k. For the encryption scheme obtained by applying Corollary 4.4 (which is depicted in Figure 5 ) we choose the parameter n = n(k) = ⌈4k/(2B − 1)⌉ such that k − n(2B − 1)/2 is bounded by −k.
The scheme's efficiency depends on the specific parameters of the HR assumption. For example, for k = 80, b = 1024 and B = 161 we obtain n = 1. In this case the scheme is the most efficient encryption scheme based on any assumption related to factoring. Message Authentication Codes. A message authentication code MAC = (Tag, Vfy) with keys mk ∈ {0, 1} k consists of a tag algorithm Tag mk (m) and a verification algorithm Vfy mk (τ ). For consistency we require that for all messages M , we have Pr[Vfy mk (M, Tag mk (M )) = ⊥] = 1, where the probability is taken over the choice of coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.
MAC needs to be strongly unforgeable against one-time attacks (SUF-OT) captured by defining the suf-ot-advantage of an adversary B mac as Above, oracle Tag mk (·) returns τ ← Tag mk (m) and A may only make one single query to oracle Tag mk (·). The target pair (m * , τ * ) must be different from the pair (m, τ ) obtained from Tag mk (·) (strong unforgeability). We remark that efficient MACs satisfying the above definition can be constructed without any computational assumption (and secure against unbounded adversaries) using, e.g., almost strongly-universal hash families [28] .
A.3 Construction of AE-OT and WAE-OT secure ciphers
We wish to construct a AE-OT (WAE-OT) secure symmetric cipher with key-space K, where |K| ≥ 2 k .
Let OTP = (Ẽ,D) be a symmetric encryption that inputs keys from {0, 1} k , let KDF a keyderivation function this inputs element from K and outputs bitstrings of length 2k, and let MAC be a MAC scheme with keys mk ∈ {0, 1} k . Using the "Encrypt-then-MAC" paradigm we can construct SE = (E, D) that inputs keys K ∈ {0, 1} ℓ as follows.
Typically, a MAC tag (from a computationally secure MAC) has k bits, so the above construction generates ciphertexts of size d (k) = |m| + k. The following lemma [5, 18, 1] guarantees the AE scheme is one-time secure.
Lemma A.1 Assume OTP is IND-OT, KDF is pseudorandom, and MAC is SUF-OT. Then SE is AE-OT. In particlar, we have We remark that for authenticated encryption is a strictly stronger security notion than chosen-ciphertext security (using a separation example from [1] ), whereas the latter is already sufficient for the KEM/DEM composition theorem [5] (i.e., a IND-CCA2 secure KEM plus chosenciphertext secure symmetric encryption implies IND-CCA2 secure PKE). On the other hand,
